OPAR 2.7: Free Will as an Axiom

Finally, Leonard Peikoff explains how the theory of free will can be proven. This section (Chapter 2, Section 7 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand) is the final section of the pre-epistemology chapter on perception and volition, and I have to admit that at first, it seemed a little odd that Peikoff saved his validation of free will for the very end. But it makes sense to me now that before you launch into proving that free will is real, you might first want to define what you think free will actually is and where it might be located. Only after that can you validate it most clearly. And so, for those wondering after all this prior discussion how we can be sure that free will is real and not just an illusion, Peikoff finishes off Chapter 2 with a strong answer. His answer goes like this:

If human consciousness were automatic, it would mean that people have no choice about their mental contents or their processes of thought. It would mean people have to accept whatever ideas the “determining force” generates within us. But if this were the case, it would mean that the whole realm of epistemology would be unnecessary and pointless. If people cannot control their thoughts, then why would rules for thinking be necessary? Rules are not set up to guide involuntary actions. That just doesn’t make any sense.

Peikoff says that the concept of “volition” is one of the roots of the concept of “validation.” He writes that “a validation of ideas is necessary and possible only because man’s consciousness is volitional” (OPAR, 70). So, any time a person asks for proof of an idea (including the idea of free will), they are presupposing the reality of free will. This is part of what makes free will an axiom. As a principle, it precedes all argument and proof. To ask for proof that free will exists is to validate its existence.

Another way that we know free will is an axiom is because it can be observed/validated by an act of introspection. Each person can choose to focus or think in any moment, or to not focus or not think. It should be immediately evident to any person who stops to observe their own thinking that at every moment, they have this ability.

Free will is an axiom also because it is primary and inescapable, a starting point of cognition and validation. The reality of free will is inescapable because those who claim that free will does not exist are forced to implicitly rely on it in any attempt to deny it. Like this:

1. If determinism is true, it would have to mean that all human choices, including choices of thought, are determined (because if even one type of choice is not determined, it would mean that free will exists in some way, shape, or form).
2. So, when a determinist says that humans are determined, it has to mean that all human ideas are also determined—that man has no power of choice in his thinking.
3. This would mean that the determinist’s own endorsement of determinism is determined—that he had no choice but to believe in determinism.
4. But if the determinist had no choice other than to believe in determinism, then why should his belief be taken seriously? How can he know that his belief is true if he had no choice but to believe it?
5. If his belief is true, and if he had no choice but to believe it, then that would mean that the factors that shape his thinking are unerring and automatically correct. This would mean that cognitive error is impossible.
6. But determinists tend not to claim that the human mind is infallible, because that would be a ridiculous and stupid thing to claim.
7. And so, when a determinist makes any sort of claim at all, he is essentially saying: My mind is fallible, but I have no choice in what my mind does. 
8. If that were the case, if people’s minds were fallible, and if people have no choice in what their minds do, they would not be able to rely on their own judgment. If that were the case, people should not be able to claim any objective knowledge, including the theory of determinism.
9. So, if a determinist wanted to deem his assessment “knowledge,” he’d have to frame his claim differently. He’d either have to say, 1) I have control over my mind. I am free to decide to focus on reality rather than on social pressures, falsifications, or subjective feelings. I am free to objectively conclude—that I am not free (72). Or, he’d have to say: 2) I have no control over my mind. Therefore, my fallible, determined consciousness is telling me that determinism is true. Your fallible, all-controlling consciousness may be telling you something different, but I’m still right because…. [oh wait, this doesn’t make any sense at all]…….
10. This is just silly. In this way, determinism is self-refuting.

Human beings who think beyond the perceptual level must use volition in order to think in a reality-oriented manner—in order to know anything at all. Peikoff writes that volition is a corollary of the axiom of consciousness (72); every fallible, conceptual consciousness has it. Volition is axiomatic because it is self-evident, because it cannot be escaped, and because it cannot be “proven.” Rather, it is implicitly relied upon as the basis of all proof. Free will is unassailable.

Peikoff finishes off Chapter 2 by saying that Ayn Rand separated free will from mysticism by identifying its emplacement within the conceptual faculty. Peikoff writes that, “the faculty of reason is the faculty of volition” (72), which he claims makes it possible to validate the principle of free will objectively, rather than mystically, for the first time in philosophic history. With this final, inspiring statement, Peikoff closes the door on sense perception and volition and prepares the way for Chapter 3: epistemology.

Questions and Concerns:

• The idea of something being “self-evident” seems potentially tricky to me because there is really no way to prove with words whether something is or isn’t self-evident. Each individual person must stop and look honestly for herself in order to know whether something is or isn’t self-evident. And it’s possible to be dishonest or confused about that. So, it seems possible to me that a confused or dishonest reader could have trouble with the statement: free will is self-evident.

Level of Difficulty: Low-ish

Mystery Number: 95

Works Cited:

1. Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York: Dutton, 1991). New York: Meridian, 1993.